




Director of
Central
Intelligence

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Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activity in Southern Africa Through 1988

National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders

~~Secret~~

NIE 11/70-85
February 1987

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

NIE 11/70-85

SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES
AND ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
THROUGH 1988 ☐

Information available as of 28 January 1987 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum to Holders, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 6 February 1987.

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
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Southern Africa



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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum to Holders updates our assessment of Soviet and Cuban policies in southern Africa in light of the events of the past two years and looks ahead two years. We have expanded somewhat our consideration of the Cuban role in the region and of Soviet Bloc long-range objectives and policies toward South Africa.

The main focus of the 1985 Estimate was the challenges confronting the Soviet and Cuban position in southern Africa at that time. The Estimate captured those challenges, which included the Nkomati and Lusaka accords, Angolan and Mozambican economic problems, UNITA military success, and the US-brokered negotiations and predicted Moscow's responses quite well. For example, the Community expected the Soviets to point up the futility of negotiating with South Africa while waiting for Nkomati and Lusaka to collapse due to their "internal contradictions" and relying on their allies' military dependence to guarantee continued Soviet influence. The Soviets successfully followed this approach as the last two years have shown. Also, the Estimate noted that the USSR would use its leverage to discourage the US-sponsored negotiations, again a response that the Soviets played out in subsequent months. Key questions of interest to policymakers—notably how the Soviets would respond to Lusaka, Nkomati, and the Namibia negotiations and how they would seek to expand their influence elsewhere—were answered in the Estimate.

Critical analysis of the 1985 Estimate indicates that:

- The range of alternative scenarios in the Angolan case was, in retrospect, too narrow. The Estimate considered the implications of further UNITA military gains and of Angolan agreement to a Namibia settlement and some level of Cuban troop withdrawal. However, it did not look at the possibility of a determined Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA offensive combined with a UNITA underestimation of its opponents' capabilities, a situation that materialized later in 1985.
- The implications of failure of US-backed regional negotiations was not explored in sufficient detail, perhaps since this was treading too close to US policy interests at the time.

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- We may have overestimated Cuban interest in at least partial withdrawal from Angola in 1984. It is equally likely, however, that there was indeed such interest at the time, and that Castro's more recent affirmations of his intent to keep forces in Angola for a virtually open-ended period reflect a direct and personal reversal of policy on his part.
- Then as now, gaps in intelligence coverage, especially on the military situation in Mozambique and Angola, made it difficult to raise the confidence level of our analysis of many aspects of Soviet and Cuban policy in the region.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Change in the Regional Outlook

Short-term Soviet and Cuban objectives in southern Africa have remained consistent over the past two years. These objectives, which they will continue to actively pursue over the next 18 months, include:

- Supporting their clients, Angola and Mozambique, against internal and external threats, albeit with a considerably greater commitment to Angola than to Mozambique.
- Preserving Soviet military access in Angola and Mozambique.
- Increasing Soviet Bloc influence in other states at the expense of the West.
- Extracting maximum propaganda value from Western association with South Africa.
- Undermining any Western initiatives that would threaten Soviet Bloc influence in the region.
- Improving their position to take advantage of developments in South Africa and to promote a pro-Soviet regime there using the ANC as their preferred instrument.

Since the 1985 Estimate, events in southern Africa have alleviated some of the challenges that confronted Soviet and Cuban pursuit of these objectives. A US-sponsored accord reducing Cuban presence and Soviet influence in the region, especially Angola, failed to materialize; the West did not offset their influence in Angola and Mozambique by providing significant economic aid; and South Africa did not impose its political and military domination over the region in the aftermath of the Nkomati and Lusaka accords.

Moscow and Havana face many factors that still work to thwart Soviet and Cuban achievement of their goals in the region—South African military predominance, ANC and SWAPO operational weakness, Soviet and Cuban inability to help their clients in Angola and Mozambique overcome insurgencies or build their economies, suspicion on the part of many states of Soviet motives, and the wider diplomatic and economic connections of the United States and the West. However, we believe that, on balance, Moscow and Havana are more confident now than in

1985 that trends in the region are not running against them. While economic constraints may affect somewhat the resources they devote to the region, their commitment to pursuit of their goals in southern Africa will remain consistent. As the security situation in the region worsens, Soviet and Cuban opportunities to expand their influence will grow.

Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets are pursuing long-term objectives in Angola and South Africa. Soviet objectives and policies in southern Africa reflect a mix of ideological, state interest, and opportunistic motivations. Critical variables that will affect the course of Soviet policy in the region include the security situation of the Luanda and Maputo regimes; South African willingness to intervene militarily in Angola, Mozambique, and other Frontline States; the success of Western policies in bringing about change in South Africa and the South African internal situation; and Soviet domestic economic constraints and political considerations.

Angola

While Angola has been the major priority of the USSR in southern Africa since the late 1970s, its importance in Soviet eyes probably increased even more over the past year due to US intervention on behalf of UNITA. Angola offers the USSR an opportunity to respond to this challenge under favorable military and political conditions:

- *Our most likely scenario* sees the Soviets continuing to build Angolan military strength while encouraging Luanda to keep steady pressure on UNITA through graduated offensive operations. In the event of limited Angolan-South African engagement, the Soviets probably would encourage Cuban units to help the Angolans, but probably would not substantially increase the role of their own advisers.
- In the event of a *South African escalation* of the conflict that threatened major Angolan formations, we believe that Moscow's preferred option would be to have Cuban troops assume the burden of helping Angolan forces, a request to which Castro would probably accede. The Soviets might also expand the role of some advisers to include combat functions and increase the quality and quantity of military deliveries, but we believe that they are highly unlikely to use their own combat formations in Angola.
- Moscow's and Havana's *long-term strategy* in Angola appears to rely on the extension of Angolan air defense capabilities and increased military proficiency to restrict South African ability to resupply UNITA and damage Angolan forces, thereby enabling

the Angolans gradually to bottle up the insurgents. Meanwhile, the Soviets seem to believe that the insurgency will, for a variety of reasons including the diminishing of external support to UNITA, become less viable over time. Fidel Castro in 1986 stated his commitment to keep Cuban forces in Angola on a virtually open-ended basis.

Mozambique

Though Mozambique has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and remains a consistent supporter of the Soviets on international issues, Moscow has not made the kind of commitment to the FRELIMO regime that it has to the Angolans. While Maputo's military plight remains serious, Zimbabwean military intervention slowed insurgent momentum and relieved the ruling FRELIMO party and the Soviets of having to deal immediately with a near-term RENAMO threat to the survival of the regime. The insurgents will continue to retain substantial momentum, but we do not see RENAMO posing an immediate military challenge to FRELIMO's political survival.

More Likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting. The Kremlin will continue its military and economic backing of Maputo, though arms deliveries are down and Moscow may well keep the scale of its aid at relatively low levels over the next few years in view of Mozambique's dismal economic situation, inability to pay, and inability to absorb new military equipment. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to encourage and assist African efforts to help Mozambique fend off the insurgents. This option reduces Soviet Bloc costs and exposure and opens possibilities for better relations with Frontline States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The Soviets will seek to extract political and propaganda advantage by playing up their support for multinational—primarily African—military action against RENAMO. At the same time, they will probably seek to discourage Mozambican participation in any multinational military arrangements that would threaten to reduce Maputo's dependence on Soviet advisory support.

Less Likely Alternate Scenarios: Rapid Deterioration. We see two other less likely scenarios worthy of comment. It is unlikely that RENAMO will pose, over the span of this Estimate, a direct threat to the survival of the FRELIMO government. However, if FRELIMO resistance were to disintegrate quickly and the rebels be in a position to take Maputo, the Soviets in our judgment would be unlikely to escalate

their involvement and shoulder the high costs of preventing the takeover themselves. They would probably generate an international clamor for a political solution. The Cubans would likely follow the Soviet lead in this instance.

Second Alternative Scenario: Gradual Deterioration. In the somewhat more likely event that Maputo's security situation continually worsens over the next two years, we believe that Moscow and Havana would respond first by encouraging Maputo's Frontline neighbors to increase their support. Second, they would increase their own military support—albeit at a gradual pace consistent with Mozambique's ability to absorb the aid—to help Maputo protect key cities and roads. An increased Cuban troop presence might well be a part of this expanded support. Any significant augmentation of the Cuban military presence would greatly increase risks of large-scale conflict with South Africa.

Namibia/SWAPO

Namibia is a low Soviet priority now that the prospect of a US-brokered deal has faded. Moreover, the Soviets appear to be concerned about SWAPO's ideological reliability, cohesion, and military potential. The Soviets and Cubans will continue to provide SWAPO with arms, training, advisory, and propaganda support, but probably will not increase their aid to the organization—whose military effectiveness is minimal—unless the Angolan situation stabilizes.

South Africa and the ANC

While the Soviets acknowledge that their current ability to influence events in South Africa is limited, they anticipate that the eventual breakdown of white rule and the emergence of a revolutionary situation there will open the way for a pro-Soviet government using the ANC as their principal instrument. We expect the USSR to continue its current actions of supplying arms to the ANC, championing its cause in the international arena, funneling support to the South African Communist Party to ensure its influence within the ANC, backing Western and Third World antiapartheid campaigns, and promoting the ANC as the leader of the antiapartheid movement inside South Africa. The Cubans have made longstanding opposition to apartheid a more central issue in their foreign policy, and will probably continue to encourage the ANC to step up military activity inside the Republic of South Africa. They may also increase the financial backing and number of advisers and trainers they provide to the ANC.

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Other States

Moscow most likely will try and build on the past year's improvement in bilateral ties to *Zimbabwe* by closing an arms deal and, along with the Cubans, supporting President Mugabe in his role as Chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. [] suggests, however, that the Kremlin is proceeding cautiously—[]

[] may be wary of being "used" by Mugabe—wariness matched by Zimbabwean suspicions of the Soviets. The Soviets will also probe the interest of Frontline States *Zambia* and *Botswana* with offers of arms for defense against South Africa, seeking to use new arms deals, as they have in *Tanzania*, to revive flagging political relationships. []

Implications for the United States

Moscow and Havana continue to demonstrate their long-term commitment to their Angolan ally even in the face of US aid to UNITA and are probably willing to escalate that support as necessary to contain the UNITA threat. While they are probably less willing to increase their commitment to Mozambique, open Western support for RENAMO would probably lead the USSR and Cuba to consider upping the ante there as well. Nonetheless, they appear far from being able to help their clients overcome the insurgencies in the foreseeable future. []

The Soviets will almost certainly remain a minor economic player in southern Africa. The political benefits the West obtains from its economic predominance will probably vary directly with the overall levels of aid it is able to give to states in the region—sharp declines could open new opportunities for the USSR in now pro-Western countries. []

While the USSR will pursue targets of opportunity in southern Africa through arms offers, economic constraints will probably lead them to be less generous than in the past on credits and repayment terms. This will almost certainly limit the attractiveness of their offers and may generate resentment on the part of those who received favorable terms in the past. []

The Kremlin most likely will be willing to discuss southern Africa with the United States in bilateral exchanges to obtain information and intelligence on US plans and proposals and may also put forward regional initiatives of its own. The Soviets will strongly oppose US diplomatic initiatives or any regional process that excluded them or promised to reduce their influence, especially any Western attempts to promote a settlement in South Africa that did not leave the ANC in a strong position. []

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We believe that any confidence that the Soviets and Cubans may have that the white regime in South Africa will, over the medium term, turn inward due to its internal problems and play a less active role in the region would be misplaced and reflect a misreading of Pretoria's capabilities to pursue its regional policies and its determination to support UNITA. Also, while some Soviet observers acknowledge UNITA's intrinsic strength as a viable political force, we believe that Soviet and Cuban policies nonetheless continue to underestimate the viability of both the UNITA and RENAMO insurgencies.

Any Soviet and Cuban failure to appreciate the potential of UNITA and RENAMO to remain viable over the long term would present them with some policy dilemmas in the next few years. Their apparent strategy of gradually building the military capability of their clients while avoiding substantial costs and risks may not prove sufficient to prevent substantial insurgent gains.

Moscow and Havana will continue to have several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in the region:

- The Frontline States may be open to expanded arms relationships with the USSR, especially if South African military pressure intensifies.
- International and African audiences will be increasingly receptive to Soviet propaganda accusing the West of supporting apartheid and portraying Moscow as the natural ally of oppressed South African blacks.
- The external prestige of the ANC will probably continue to increase even as its internal capabilities will remain limited, enhancing the Soviet image as a longtime backer of the ANC.
- Any improvement in the military situation of Soviet clients Angola and Mozambique will offer opportunities for Moscow to upgrade support to SWAPO and the ANC.
- A sharp decline in Western economic aid could strengthen hardline pro-Soviets in Frontline States at the expense of more moderate leaders.

DISCUSSION

The Regional Dimension

1. Since the previous Estimate was published in 1985, the following events and trends have unfolded in southern Africa:

- The United States has initiated a program of military support for UNITA, directly challenging a Soviet ally. At the same time, the US-sponsored regional negotiations collapsed.
- The African National Congress has attracted increased support on the world stage while remaining operationally weak inside South Africa. Meanwhile, the importance of apartheid on the African, Western, and international agendas has intensified.
- Angola and Mozambique have not obtained the levels of economic aid they were seeking from the West.
- Frontline States, fearful of South African intervention, have sought arms from both East and West.
- For a variety of reasons, Soviet arms deliveries to one of their allies, Mozambique, have dropped off over the past two years, while those to Angola have continued at high levels (see table 1).
- Insurgencies against Soviet client regimes in both Mozambique and Angola have not abated despite Soviet and Cuban military assistance. ☐

Consistent Objectives and Commitment

2. Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets are pursuing long-term objectives in Angola and South Africa. Soviet objectives and policies in southern Africa reflect a mix of ideological, state interest, and opportunistic motivations. The significance of the region in Soviet eyes may have risen somewhat over the past two years as US involvement on behalf of UNITA magnified its standing as an arena of East-West competition. ☐

3. The Soviets and Cubans continue to work together closely in southern Africa in pursuit of the

objectives specified in the 1985 Estimate: supporting the self-professed Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and Mozambique against internal and external threats, preserving Soviet military access in these countries, increasing Soviet Bloc influence in other states at the expense of the West, extracting maximum propaganda value from real and alleged Western association with South Africa, and undermining any Western diplomatic initiatives that would threaten their influence in the region. Over the long term, Moscow and Havana are seeking to promote a pro-Soviet government in Pretoria using the ANC as their preferred instrument. ☐

4. In the previous Estimate, we judged that Moscow and Havana faced significant challenges to their position in the region. Since then, some of the above developments have reduced Soviet concern that the West would offset their influence in Angola and Mozambique and gain a predominant diplomatic position in the region. Moreover, South Africa has proved unable to impose its political dominance on Angola and Mozambique at Soviet and Cuban expense, as appeared possible after Pretoria signed nonaggression pacts with Luanda and Maputo in 1984. ☐

Important Problems Remain

5. Many factors still work to thwart Soviet and Cuban achievement of their goals. South Africa remains the area's strongest military power, and its internal difficulties may make it more rather than less inclined to strike or foment dissent in neighboring states. The military capabilities of both the ANC and SWAPO are minimal, and Namibia has receded on the international agenda. Although the military situation in Angola has improved somewhat, it has not stabilized. Maputo's military prospects remain grim. Moscow and Havana have not been able to come up with an approach capable of defeating the insurgents in either Angola or Mozambique. Both of these Soviet allies have serious economic problems, which Moscow has been unable or unwilling to resolve. Also, in spite of their willingness to accept Soviet Bloc military aid

in dealing with South Africa, Frontline States such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia harbor suspicions of Moscow's political motives. Finally, the United States continues to play an active role in the area and is the only superpower that has contacts with all of the significant regional players, pro-Western and pro-Soviet alike.

6. We believe that, on balance, Moscow and Havana are more confident now than they were in early 1985 that trends in southern Africa are not running against them. We expect the USSR and Cuba to continue, and, with heightened regional tensions, intensify their efforts—including propaganda, active measures, technical and political education, labor union activity, and party-to-party contacts¹—to expand their influence and presence in southern Africa and to try to undermine that of the West. Economic constraints in both countries and regional developments will affect the resources each is willing to devote to the region. We believe, however, that the commitment of both Moscow and Havana to their objectives in southern Africa will remain consistent for the foreseeable future.

Motives and Key Variables

7. Moscow's policy in southern Africa reflects most of the motivations that underlie Soviet involvement in the Third World. South Africa is the most important country because of its central economic relationship with capitalist countries and because of its anti-Communist policies backed by regionally dominant military capabilities. In Angola, we see the ideological imperative of defending self-professed Marxist-Leninist states against "imperialist neoglobalism"—Soviet jargon for US foreign policy, including the "Reagan Doctrine"—combined with the Soviet state interest in supporting an ally in an area that is of strategic importance due to its economic potential, mineral wealth, location along important sea routes, and ties to the West. In Mozambique, the key motives of Soviet policy appear to be fundamentally conservative, as Moscow tries to preserve a previously gained position while avoiding significant new commitments and exposure. Elsewhere, we see the USSR exploiting new opportunities, seeking entree in Zimbabwe and improved relations with Tanzania on the basis of these countries' fear of South Africa.

¹ See NI IIM 86-10003, *Soviet Economic Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: Politics in Command*, (Secret NF NC OC), March 1986, for a detailed discussion of these activities.

8. Critical variables affecting the interplay of Soviet motivations and the Kremlin's policy choices in southern Africa include:

- The security of the client regimes in Maputo and Luanda.
- The extent of South African willingness to intervene militarily in Angola and Mozambique and to strike at the ANC in other Frontline States.
- The success of Western policies aimed at bringing about change in South Africa.
- Soviet domestic economic constraints and political considerations.

Angola

9. While Angola has been the major priority of the USSR in southern Africa since the late 1970s, its importance in Soviet eyes probably increased even more over the past year due to Moscow's perception of US intervention on behalf of UNITA. Angola offers the USSR an opportunity to respond to this challenge under favorable military and political conditions. It should be noted that in our estimation over 50 percent of Luanda's oil revenues (which were assessed at \$1.9 billion in 1985) has gone to the USSR and Cubans as hard currency payment for their military support. These payments almost certainly declined in 1986 due to falling oil prices.

More Likely Scenario: Steady Pressure, Limited Risk

10. Since FAPLA's 1985 military offensive, which improved the government's position, the Soviets have continued to build Angola's military strength, especially in the area of air defense. We believe that the Soviets favor and may indeed have recommended the current Angolan military strategy of keeping steady pressure on UNITA through graduated, medium-scale offensive operations, an approach that enables Moscow to control the risks of confrontation with South Africa, keep costs at a reasonable level, preserve Angolan military dependence on the USSR, and deny UNITA successes that might attract increased outside support. For his part, Castro has personally underscored his commitment to Angola by reiterating that he will not withdraw Cuban military personnel, which now number about 36,000, until the conditions he specified last summer—guaranteed independence for Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa—are fulfilled.²

11. In our judgment, the Soviets are strongly disinclined to confront South African forces directly, and most likely prefer that the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) avoid major engagements with the South African Defense Force (SADF) as well. In the event of a limited FAPLA-SADF engagement, Soviet advisers in Angola would probably not go beyond their present support and advisory functions—the Soviets probably accept the fact that South Africa will deal FAPLA some local setbacks. However, they might encourage Cuba to commit its combat formations, which generally occupy defensive positions, to engage in offensive operations.

Less Likely Scenario: Major South African Escalation

12. A major South African attack that threatened the viability of a large FAPLA formation could lead Moscow to consider allowing Soviet pilots and, perhaps, other advisers limited participation in combat operations, though we believe that Moscow's preferred option would again be to encourage the Cubans to assume the burden of rescuing FAPLA. Castro probably would accede to this in such a crisis situation. We continue to believe that the Soviets are highly unlikely to use their own combat formations in Angola.

Long-Term Strategy

13. Over the long run, the USSR is probably counting on the extension of Angola's air defense network and increased FAPLA proficiency to restrict SADF freedom of movement over Angola and limit its ability to resupply UNITA and to damage Angolan forces on the ground. This in turn would enable the Angolans to contain UNITA in a shrinking pocket in the southeast with reduced risk of South African retaliation. Meanwhile, Moscow will look to the following factors to reduce the viability of the insurgency over the next several years:

- South Africa's need to concentrate on mounting internal troubles, which could reduce the attention and resources it can devote to backing UNITA.
- The eventual passing from the scene of Jonas Savimbi, which will remove a major element of UNITA cohesion and strength.

- Change in the United States' policy of supporting UNITA in the aftermath of the Contra diversion issue and the presidential and congressional elections of 1988.

The Soviets, in our judgment, may be overestimating the effects of these factors on UNITA viability. Internal troubles may, as we have noted, lead Pretoria to play a more active military role in the region, while UNITA is likely to survive after the departure of Savimbi. We expect the Soviets and their allies to continue their diplomatic, propaganda, and active measures activity aimed at discrediting UNITA as a tool of Pretoria and the West in an effort to promote the third of these factors.

Mozambique

14. While Mozambique has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and remains a consistent supporter of the Soviets on international issues, Moscow has not made the kind of commitment to the FRELIMO regime that it has to the Angolans. This is due to Soviet perceptions that FRELIMO is less committed to close ties to Moscow and to Marxism-Leninism than is the MPLA, Maputo's economic and political dealings with the West and South Africa, and its overall economic and military weakness.

15. While Maputo's military plight remains serious, Zimbabwean military intervention slowed insurgent momentum and relieved the ruling FRELIMO party and the Soviets of having to deal immediately with a near-term RENAMO threat to the survival of the regime. The insurgents will continue to retain substantial momentum, but we do not see RENAMO posing an immediate military challenge to FRELIMO's political survival. Moscow's primary near-term objective in Mozambique is to help the regime defend itself without incurring significant new costs or commitments and to encourage the new Chissano government to revitalize Mozambique's pursuit of socialism at home and close ties to the USSR.

More Likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting

16. The Kremlin will continue its military and economic backing of Maputo, though arms deliveries are down and Moscow may well keep the scale of its aid at relatively low levels over the next few years in view of Mozambique's dismal economic situation, inability to pay, and inability to absorb new military equipment (see table 1). The Soviets will almost certainly continue to encourage and assist African efforts

to help Mozambique fend off the insurgents. This option reduces Soviet Bloc costs and exposure and opens possibilities for better relations with Frontline States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The Soviets will seek to extract political and propaganda advantage by playing up their support for multinational—primarily African—military action against RENAMO. At the same time, they will probably seek to discourage Mozambican participation in any multinational military arrangements that would threaten to reduce Maputo's dependence on Soviet advisory support.

**Less Likely Alternative Scenario:
Rapid Deterioration**

17. We see two other less likely scenarios worthy of comment. It is unlikely that RENAMO will pose, over the span of this Estimate, a direct threat to the survival of the FRELIMO government. However, if FRELIMO resistance were to disintegrate quickly and the rebels be in a position to take Maputo, the Soviets, in our judgment, would be unlikely to escalate their involvement and shoulder the high costs of preventing the takeover themselves. They would most likely generate an international clamor for a political solution. The Cubans probably would follow the Soviet lead in this instance.³

**Second Alternative Scenario:
Gradual Deterioration**

18. In the somewhat more likely event that Maputo's security situation continually worsens over the next two years, we believe that Moscow and Havana would respond first by encouraging Maputo's Frontline neighbors to increase their military support. Second, they would increase their own military support—albeit at a gradual pace consistent with Mozambique's ability to absorb the aid—to help Maputo protect key cities and roads. An increased Cuban troop presence might well be a part of this expanded support. Any significant augmentation of the Cuban military presence would greatly increase risks of large-scale conflict with South Africa.

Namibia/SWAPO

19. Namibia is a low Soviet priority now that the prospect of a US-brokered deal has faded. The Soviets

appear to be concerned about SWAPO's ideological reliability, cohesion, and military potential, and the USSR would probably prefer that SWAPO maintain a relatively low profile so as not to complicate the situation in Angola. The Soviet Bloc will continue to supply arms, training, advisory, and propaganda support to SWAPO but will probably not increase assistance to the organization—whose military effectiveness is now minimal—until the Angolan situation stabilizes. Cuba has been pressing other nonaligned states to provide material aid to SWAPO, and Castro, whose commitment to the movement has not flagged over the years, is likely to maintain Cuban support at current levels.

South Africa: Long-Range Approach

20. The USSR's long-term goal in South Africa is the promotion of a pro-Soviet regime using the ANC as its principal instrument. Over the next decade or more, Moscow is looking to the breakdown of the present order in South Africa and the emergence of a revolutionary situation that the ANC, by virtue of its national appeal and access to arms and financial support, will be in good position to exploit. Over the next few years, the Soviets will most likely continue their current mix of actions—supplying arms for the ANC, funneling support to the South African Communist Party to ensure its influence within the ANC, vocally backing Third World and Western antiapartheid campaigns, championing the ANC in international organizations, and castigating the West for allegedly propping up apartheid—intended to promote the ANC as the leader of South African opposition, score propaganda points against the West, and portray the USSR as Black Africa's true ally.

21. Soviet officials have acknowledged that their current ability to influence events in South Africa is limited. While Moscow has considerable influence in the ANC as a result of East Bloc supply of about 90 percent of its arms and the prominent leadership role played by South African Communist Party (SACP) members, there are ANC leadership elements that are opposed to direct Soviet influence, and the ANC itself does not have direct control of the antiapartheid campaign inside the Republic of South Africa. Soviet writings suggest concern that the ANC may be vulnerable to a split between pro-Soviet hardliners and nationalist elements willing to consider negotiating with the white government. As a result, Moscow will keep a close eye on the ANC through the KGB and SACP and could use the leverage that it does have to try to prevent ANC moves in a moderate direction.

22. The Cubans have reportedly encouraged the ANC to step up military activity inside South Africa, perhaps in the belief that this might help Angola by deflecting South African attention from UNITA. On the political side, in 1986 Castro increased the tempo of his longstanding opposition to apartheid and he may incrementally increase training and other assistance to the ANC. []

Zimbabwe

23. Soviet-Zimbabwean relations have improved over the past 18 months, as President Mugabe traveled to Moscow for the first time on a high-profile state visit. For their part, the Soviets appear to have given up the option of supporting anti-Mugabe elements and are concentrating on their longtime objective of improving ties to Harare by exploiting Mugabe's fear of South Africa, his alignment with Mozambique, and his socialist inclinations. The Soviets and Cubans gave Zimbabwe extensive financial help for the 1986 Non-Aligned Movement Conference and supported most of the NAM positions advocated by Mugabe in his role as chairman. Havana is setting up medical and educational exchange programs with Harare. []

24. Moscow and Harare are currently involved in protracted negotiations for an air defense package that would help Zimbabwe defend against South African attack. []

[] Moscow sees Harare as fairly well off financially and is also probably wary of being "used" by Mugabe—wariness matched by Zimbabwean suspicions of the Soviets. Thus, the Soviets will probably not pay a high price in credits or other concessions to improve relations with Harare. However, they and the Cubans will continue to offer political support and probe for opportunities to expand their presence and influence in Harare, including offering to support Zimbabwean intervention in Mozambique. Mugabe, meanwhile, will pick and choose among these offers but is unlikely to allow major gains in Soviet or Cuban presence and influence unless South African military and economic pressure increases dramatically. []

Other Frontline States

25. The once warm Soviet ties to *Tanzania* have deteriorated as a result of Tanzanian unhappiness with Soviet military and economic support. Moscow relies

on Dar es Salaam's lack of alternative military suppliers to ensure continued influence there, and in late 1986 Tanzania's perceived need for arms to defend against South Africa led it to conclude a new arms deal with the USSR. Moscow also has provided logistic support for the Tanzanian military contingent in Mozambique. The Cubans have a limited intelligence and security cooperation agreement with Tanzania []

[] but we see little prospect of significant Cuban gains there. Generally Western-oriented *Zambia* and *Botswana* have expressed similar frustration with their Soviet-supplied arms and neither has yet returned to the USSR for more military support. While the top priority of all of these states is obtaining economic help, the Soviets will look for opportunities to play on their military aid needs and will also seek openings to revive their now moribund position in *Lesotho*. Increased influence in any of these countries could improve Soviet ability to support future ANC activity, but would also expose these states to South African retaliation. The Soviets stand little chance of gaining even an opening for influence in *Malawi* in the near term. []

Implications for the United States

26. The Soviets and Cubans continue to demonstrate their long-term commitment to their Angolan ally even in the face of US assistance to UNITA and are probably willing to escalate their military backing as necessary to prevent UNITA from posing a direct threat to the MPLA regime. While they are probably less willing to increase their commitment to Mozambique, open Western support for RENAMO might lead the USSR to consider upping the ante. In spite of their extensive military aid and apparent long-term strategy of strengthening Angolan and Mozambican military capabilities, the efficacy of Soviet and Cuban efforts to help their African allies end the insurgencies remains in doubt. []

27. The Soviets continue to be a minor player in the economic sphere. The USSR has not provided even its closest African allies with the economic aid needed by their ailing economies, and all of the black-ruled states of southern Africa, including Angola and Mozambique, look to the West for economic assistance. The political benefits that the West gains from its predominant economic role in the region are likely to vary directly with the overall levels of aid that the West is able to give, and a sharp decline in economic aid could open new opportunities for the USSR in presently pro-Western countries. []

28. While the USSR will pursue targets of opportunity in southern Africa through arms offers, economic constraints will probably contribute to greater Soviet reluctance to be generous on credits and repayment terms. This will almost certainly limit the attractiveness of their offers and may generate resentment on the part of those who received favorable terms in the past. []

29. The USSR most likely will be willing to discuss southern African issues with the United States in bilateral exchanges in order to obtain information and intelligence on US plans and proposals. Moscow may also put forward proposals for a regional conference to polish its credentials on regional issues and avoid ceding the diplomatic initiative to the United States. As they did during the US-sponsored Namibia negotiations, however, the Soviets will push their clients not to accept any US diplomatic initiative or other regional process that promises to exclude the USSR or reduce Soviet and Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa. Any Western attempts to promote a power-sharing arrangement in South Africa that did not leave the ANC as the dominant political body would be especially likely to become a target of Soviet propaganda, active measures, and diplomacy. []

30. We believe that any confidence that the Soviets and Cubans may have that the white regime in South Africa will, over the medium term, turn inward due to its internal problems and play a less active role in the region would be misplaced and reflect a misreading of Pretoria's capabilities to pursue its regional policies and its determination to support UNITA. Also, while some Soviet observers acknowledge UNITA's intrinsic strength as a viable political force, we believe that Soviet and Cuban policies nonetheless continue to underestimate the viability of both the UNITA and RENAMO insurgencies. []

31. Any Soviet and Cuban failure to appreciate the potential of UNITA and RENAMO to remain viable over the long term would present them with some policy dilemmas in the next few years. Their apparent strategy of gradually building the military capability of their clients while avoiding substantial costs and risks may not prove sufficient to prevent substantial insurgent gains. []

32. Moscow and Havana will continue to have several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in the region:

- The Frontline States may be open to expanded arms relationships with the USSR, especially if South African military pressure intensifies.
- International and African audiences will be increasingly receptive to Soviet propaganda accusing the West of supporting apartheid and portraying Moscow as the natural ally of oppressed South African blacks.
- The external prestige of the ANC will probably continue to increase even as its internal capabilities will remain limited, enhancing the Soviet image as a longtime backer of the ANC.
- Any improvement in the military situation of Soviet clients Angola and Mozambique will offer opportunities for Moscow to upgrade support to SWAPO and the ANC.
- A sharp decline in Western economic aid could strengthen hardline pro-Soviets in Frontline States at the expense of more moderate leaders. []

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Table 1
Soviet Military Deliveries to
Selected Sub-Saharan African States ^a

Million US \$

	Angola	Botswana	Mozambique	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1980						
1981						
1982						
1983						
1984						
1985						
1986						

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Table 2
Southern Africa: Communist Military
Technicians and Troops, 1986

Number of persons ^a

	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
Angola	1,200	500	36,000
Botswana	0	0	0
Mozambique	800	325-375	800
Tanzania	75	0	5
Zambia	70	NA	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0

^a Numbers are preliminary. Minimum estimate of the number of persons for a period of one month or more.

This table is ~~Secret~~

Table 3
Southern Africa: Communist
Economic Technicians, 1986

Number of persons ^a

	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
Angola	1,500	975	6,000
Botswana	0	0	0
Mozambique	900	1,850	1,025
Tanzania	60	50	25
Zambia	250	155	15
Zimbabwe	0	40	5

^a Numbers are preliminary. Minimum estimates of number present for one month or more.

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